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PRESIDENTIAL PENSIONS AND IMPEACHMENT: A
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The Former Presidents Act' grants annual monetary and clerical
allowances and free office space2 to "former Presidents."'3 Under the Act a
1 3 U.S.C. § 102 note (1970) [hereinafter cited as Former Presidents Act]. The
predecessor of the Former Presidents Act, S. 1516, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), was
passed unanimously by the United States Senate on May 5, 1955. However, no action
on the bill was taken by the House of Representatives during the remainder of the
Eighty-fourth Congress. The Act was passed in its present form in 1958. See note 2
infra. For legislative history of S. 1516, see S. REP. No. 205, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955); 101 CONG. REC. 5731-32 (1955); 13 CONG. Q. W. REP. 487, 514 (1955).
The Presidential Transition Act of 1963, 3 U.S.C. § 102 note (1970), also allocates
certain benefits to former Presidents, but only for an interim period of the six
months following the expiration of his or her term of office as President. The Presi-
dential Transition Act will not be discussed in this article because its essential pur-
poses are distinct from those of the Former Presidents Act.
2 In its original form, the Former Presidents Act granted each "former President"
a monetary allowance of $25,000 per year for life. In addition, each former President
was granted free office space, free mailing privileges, and $50,000 per year to main-
tain an office staff. The Act also authorized a $10,000 annual pension for widows of
former Presidents. For the legislative history of the original version of the Former
Presidents Act, see S. REP. No. 47, 85th Cong, Ist Sess. (1957); H.R. REP. No.
2200, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. No. 2657, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
(1958); Hearings on H.R. 4401 and S. 607 Before the House Comm. on the Post
Office and Civil Service, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); 103 CONG. REC. 1386, 1411,
1457-59 (1957); 104 CONG. REC. 14167, 15619-41, 17961-62, 18940-44 (1958);
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1957, at 16, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1957, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, June 27, 1958, at 9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 18, 1958, at 19, col. 3; N.Y.
Times, July 30, 1958, at 14, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 31, 1958, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Aug. 16, 1958, at 8, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1958, at 12, col. 8; N.Y.
Times, Aug. 26, 1958, at 19, col. 4.
The annual monetary allowance has been raised to $60,000; this amount being
equivalent to the annual salary of the head of an executive department. Former
Presidents Act § a. See also 2 U.S.C. § 358 (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 5312 (1970). Neverthe-
less, a former President who holds an elective or appointive position in the federal
or District of Columbia governments for which he receives other than a nominal
salary cannot receive this monetary allowance during the period he holds such a
position. Former Presidents Act § a.
Each former President is entitled under the Act to an office staff and office
space provided by the Administrator of General Services. Former Presidents Act
§§ b, c. The aggregate amount of allowable staff salaries has been raised to $96,000
per year. Also, at present, no individual staff member's salary may exceed $42,500
per year; this amount is the highest annual salary provided by law for level II
positions of the Executive Schedule under 5 U.S.C. § 5313 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. 1973). Former Presidents Act § b. The office space allocated to a former
President must be "suitable," "appropriately furnished and equipped," and located
within the United States at such place the former President shall specify. Former
Presidents Act § c.
In 1960, Congress repealed the "free mailing privileges" provision of the Former
Presidents Act and recodified it in two separate statutes, now 39 U.S.C. § 3214
(Supp. 1973) and 39 U.S.C. § 3216(b) (Supp. 1973). These two statutes provide free
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President is ineligible to receive any retirement benefits if he or she is
removed from office by impeachment and conviction in the Congress of the
United States. 4 However, a President facing imminent impeachment can
retain the benefits by resigning before the impeachment process culminates
in his removal from office. 5 Constitutional considerations indicate that the
benefits conferred by the Act could not be revoked or reduced by special
congressional legislation upon resignation; such action could be challenged
as a bill of attainder6 or an ex post facto law.7 Such special legislation could
also deprive a former President of his or her due process8 and equal pro-
tection rights. 9 This article will focus on the various means available to
deny or reduce these benefits in appropriate circumstances and will explore
possible alternatives to the present system. 10
I. THE ACT'S OBJECTIVES
The general provisions of the Former Presidents Act achieve valuable
social and political goals. The statute seeks to enable former Presidents to
mailing privileges for nonpolitical items for former Presidents and their widows
and reimbursement, out of the general funds of the Treasury, to the United States
Postal Service for the postal revenue lost because of this privilege.
The yearly monetary allowance to "widows" of former Presidents presently
amounts to $20,000 per year. Former Presidents Act § e. In light of the recent
decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), a widower of a former
President would also be entitled to these benefits. Wiesenfeld held that a social security
provision awarding survivors benefits to the widow and children of a deceased wage
earner while denying them to the widower of a female wage earner violated the "im-
plied" equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment. See Note, Presumption of
Dependence in Worker's Compensation Death Benefits as a Denial of Equal Protection,
9 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 138 (1975). But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
(denying a property tax exemption to widowers while granting it to widows does not
violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause).
Certain restrictions are imposed upon the eligibilty of widows (and widowers) for
this allowance. First, in order to claim it, the widow must waive the right to any
other federal annuity or pension to which she is entitled. Second, the allowance,
which is to be paid to the widow of a former President beginning on the day after
that former President dies, is to terminate on the last day of the month before the
widow dies, or remarries before reaching 60 years of age. Finally, the widow may
not receive this pension while holding an elective or appointive position in the
federal or District of Columbia government "to which is attached a rate of pay other
than a nominal rate." Former Presidents Act § e.
3 The Former Presidents Act § f, defines a "former President" as a person
(1) who shall have held the office of President of the United States of
America;
(2) whose service in such office shall have terminated other than by
removal pursuant to section 4 of article II of the Constitution of the
United States of America; and
(3) who does not then currently hold such office.
4 See note 3 supra. A President of the United States may be removed from office
upon impeachment and conviction for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." U. S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
5 See notes 16-18 and accompanying text infra.
6 See notes 20-33 and accompanying text infra.
7 See notes 34-42 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 43-85 and accompanying text infra.
9 See notes 86-134 and accompanying text infra.
10 See notes 135-75 and accompanying text infra.
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continue their accustomed life style without financial hardship and thereby
maintain the dignity of the Presidency." Through the compensation and
facilities granted them, former Presidents are encouraged to meet the public
demands upon their time and financial resources.' 2 The Former Presidents
Act also endeavors to make former Presidents available for further public
service. 13
II. TERMINATION AND REDUCTION OF
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
There are some circumstances under which the grant of retirement bene-
fits to a former President may violate the underlying policy of the Former
Presidents Act.1 4 For example, the objectives outlined above would not be
fulfilled by granting retirement benefits to a former President who had com-
mitted a serious impeachable offense while in office.15 With this situation
in mind, the remainder of this section will examine and discuss various
methods whereby the retirement benefits granted to a former President may
be terminated or reduced.
11 S. REP. No. 47, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957). For further discussion of the
general purposes of the Former Presidents Act of 1958, see H.R. REP. No. 2200,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. No. 2657, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 103
CONG. REC. 1458. (1957) (remarks of Senator Johnson); 104 CONG. REC. 15622-23
(1958) (remarks of Representative Morrison); 104 CONG. REC. 15624-25 (1958) (re-
marks of Representative McCormack). On the past financial difficulties of former
Presidents, see Hearings on H.R. 4401 and S. 607 Before the House Comm. on the
Post Office and Civil Service, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1957); 77 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Sept. 16, 1974, at 26; Drury, Ex-President's Lot Is Not Easy, N.Y.
Times, July 27, 1958, § 4, at 6, col. 1; Walz, Why Pensions for Ex-Presidents?,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1957, § 4, at 6, col. 6.
12 S. REP. No. 47, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957).
13 Id.
14 For example, note the outrage expressed by certain public sectors at the grant
of these pension benefits to former President Richard M. Nixon following his resig-
nation in August, 1974. See generally 77 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 16, 1974,
at 26; N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1974, at 6, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1974, at 1, col. 4;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1974, at 28, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1974, at 5, col. 6.
15 "Treason" and "Bribery" are the only specific impeachable offenses in the
Constitution; other grounds for impeachment are defined only as "other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. The precise scope of this category of
impeachable offenses has never been authoritatively defined. See, e.g., C. BLACK, IM-
PEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 25-52 (1974); R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROBLEMS 53-102 (1973); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IM-
PEACHMENT (Comm. Print 1974). One of the broadest interpretations of what con-
stitutes an impeachable offense was advanced by then Congressman Gerald Ford in
1970 when he declared that
an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Repre-
sentatives considers it to be at a given moment in history; conviction
results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body
considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused
from office .... [T]here are few mixed principles among the handful of
precedents.
11&CONG. REC. 11913 (1970).
Notwithstanding this uncertainty as to the proper scope of impeachable offenses,
there is little doubt that a President who is convicted in a court of law of certain
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A. Under the Former Presidents Act
The current statute provides that an ex-President of the United States
cannot received retirement benefits if he or she is removed from office by
the impeachment process. 6 The text of the statute indicates, however, that
a President who "leaves" office 17 before conviction in the Senate remains
eligible for retirement benefits since his service in office was terminated
"other than by removal pursuant to section 4 of Article II of the Con-
stitution."'18 This result would violate the spirit and purpose of the Former
Presidents Act in that the grant of such benefits would not dignify the
Presidential office, a former President who escaped impeachment and
conviction by resigning would not have the "public demands" upon his
time and financial resources contemplated by Congress when it enacted
the Former Presidents Act, and it is unlikely that such a former President
would be called upon for further public service.' 9
grave offenses such as perjury or obstruction of justice should not receive these
pension benefits in the light of the professed objectives of the Act, which are to
maintain the dignity of the office of the Presidency, to enable former Presidents to
meet public demands upon their time and resources, and to make them available
for further public service.
16 Former Presidents Act § f(2).
17 In addition to being removed from office by impeachment and conviction, a
President may "leave" office by resigning pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § (1970), dying in
office, permitting the official term to expire, or by being succeeded by the Vice-
President pursuant to the twenty-fifth amendment to the Constitution.
18 Former Presidents Act § f(2). A President who faces imminent removal from
office by the impeachment process could leave office before being impeached in the
House of Representatives. Alternatively, he could be impeached while still in office
but leave office before being convicted in the Senate. At least one commentator
has asserted that there might be an important difference between the alternatives
in terms of the scope of Congress' impeachment power:
The power of impeachment is granted for the public protection in order
to not only remove, but perpetually disqualify for office a person who
has shown himself dangerous to the commonwealth by his official
acts. The object of this salutary constitutional provision would be
defeated, could a person by his resignation from office obtain immunity
from impeachment....
If it be conceded that in any case a person can be convicted by the Sen-
ate upon an impeachment when out of office, the rule must apply to all.
... Consequently, if the view maintained ... is correct, a public officer
may resign his office during an impeachment, after his conviction,
at any time before the sentence has been actually pronounced. That
would be to render the whole proceedings nugatory and absurd. It
cannot be that the Constitution warrants such an absurdity.
The last part of this argument seems not beyond dispute. There is a
wide distinction between an exit from office pending an impeachment
and one before. After the jurisdiction of the court has one attached, by
the vote of the House of Representatives that an officer be impeached,
it may well be claimed that no subsequent act by him or by the
President can divest it.
1 R. FOSTER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 575-76
(1895) (footnote omitted). Thus, if Foster's distinction between these alternatives
is correct, a President who left office after his impeachment but before his sub-
sequent conviction would be disqualified from receiving these retirement benefits
under the Former Presidents Act; the Senate conviction effectively removing him
from office notwithstanding his prior departure.
19 Of course, it is possible that a former President who resigned in the face of
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B. Pursuant to Special Congressional
Legislation
Although a President facing impeachment could preserve his pension
benefits under the Act by resigning prior to conviction in the Senate,
Congress could terminate such rights by enacting special legislation to this
effect. Such legislation, however, would be subject to constitutional chal-
lenges as being: (1) a bill of attainder; (2) an ex post facto law; and (3) a
denial of the former President's due process and equal protection rights.
Each of these challenges will be discussed below in an effort to determine
what type of legislation in this area would meet each of these constitutional
challenges. Specific proposals for legislation that will enable Congress to
limit or deny Presidential pensions in particular cases will be made in part
III.
1. Bill of Attainder-The federal government is prohibited by the
Constitution from enacting any "bill of attainder. 20 In United States v.
O'Brien,21 the Supreme Court defined a "bill of attainder" as
a legislative Act which inflicts punishment on named individuals
or members of an easily ascertainable group without a judicial
trial. In determining whether a particular statute is a bill of
attainder, the analysis necessarily requires an inquiry into whether
the three definitional elements-specificity in identification,
punishment, and lack of a judicial trial-are contained in the
statute. The inquiry into whether the challenged statute contains
the necessary element of punishment has on occasion led the
court to examine the legislative motive in enacting the statute.2 2
Under this definition, congressional legislation revoking or reducing
retirement benefits due a former President under the Former Presidents
Act would be a constitutionally prohibited bill of attainder since the legis-
lation would specifically identify its subject. Whether the bill referred to
the particular former President by name or to a class of former Presidents
sharing a common characteristic, for example, all former Presidents who
were impeached and resigned before conviction, the bill's limited
applicability and predictable practical effect would indicate a clear intent
to affect only a certain individual or individuals. In United States v.
Lovett,23 the Supreme Court struck down a statute denying three named
employees of federal agencies compensation for services rendered in their
imminent impeachment would be called upon for further public service and would
have to meet pressing public demands. For example, he may have been pardoned
and thereafter led an exemplary life. Also, it might not dignify the Presidential
office to have a former President, found guilty of bribery, to live in abject poverty.
However, these occurrences are improbable at best.
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. For the constitutional history of the bill of attainder in
England and the United States, see Z. CHAFFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CON-
STITUTION OF 1787, 90-161 (1956); THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 301-02 (J. COOKE ed.
1961) (J. Madison); Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested
Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962).
21391 U.S. 367 (1968).
22 Id. at 383-84 n.30.
23 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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official capacities. Lovett can be contrasted with United States v. Brown,24
where the Court invalidated a federal law making it a crime for an
individual who belonged to the Communist Party to serve on a labor
organization's executive board. Although the statute at issue in Brown
made no reference by name to specific indivduals, the Court refused to
distinguish Lovett, relying upon English history which is replete with "acts
of attainder [inflicting] their deprivations upon relatively large groups of
people, sometimes by description rather than name. '25 The Court followed
two Civil War cases, Cummings v. Missouri2 6 and Ex parte Garland2 which
struck down state and federal laws requiring that loyalty oaths be taken as
a condition to the continued practice of certain professions. The "identifiable
class" subject to these bills of attainder were those unnamed individuals
who could not subscribe to the oaths.
Legislation reducing or revoking a former President's benefits would be
"punishment" if the legislative record displayed a desire to penalize the
former President because of his conduct in office. In Lovett, the Court
noted that the challenged legislation was enacted with punitive intent:
The fact that the punishment is inflicted through the instrumen-
tality of an Act specifically cutting off the pay of certain named
individuals found guilty of disloyalty, makes it no less galling or
effective than if it had been done by an Act which distinguished
the conduct as criminal.2
8
Thus, if legislation terminating or reducing a particular former President's
retirement benefits were enacted after he had resigned to avoid certain
impeachment and conviction in Congress, such legislation would be
characterized as "punishment" in light of Lovett, especially if the legislative
record indicated a congressional desire to penalize him for his conduct in
office. However, if the legislation were drafted to regulate the behavior of
former Presidents and did not focus on a particular individual, the legis-
lation would be immune from a bill of attainder challenge. 29 For example,
if the statute declared that all former Presidents convicted of a felony
under state or federal law would be ineligible for further retirement
benefits, the legislation would probably be upheld against a bill of attainder
24 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
25 Id. at 461.
26 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
27 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
28 328 U.S. at 316.
29 The test of what constitutes proscribed "punishment" and permissible "reg-
ulation" for purposes of the bill of attainder clause was expressed by the Supreme
Court in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), discussed in part II B 4(b) infra:
In determining whether legislation which bases a disqualification on the
happening of a certain past event imposes a punishment, the Court
has sought to discern the objects on which the enactment in question
was focused. Where the source of legislative concern can be thought
to be the activity or status from which the individual is barred, the
disqualification is not punishment even though it may bear harshly
upon one affected. The contrary is the case where the statute in ques-
tion is evidently aimed at the person or class of persons disqualified.
363 U.S. at 613-14.
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challenge as a proper exercise of the federal spending power.30 In Flemming
v. Nestor,31 the Supreme Court rejected a bill of attainder challenge to fed-
eral legislation terminating old-age social security benefits payable to an
alien who was deported after the date of enactment. After examining a
"meagre" legislative history, the Court found that the legislation was
neither "aimed at particular individuals" nor "concerned alone with the
grounds of deportation" and thus was a proper exercise of the spending
power.32
Finally, as in Lovett, the congressional enactment of such legislation
terminating or reducing a particular President's retirement benefits and
otherwise qualifying as a bill of attainder, would not involve a judicial
trial, 33 and would, therefore, bear all three marks of a classic bill of
attainder.
2. Ex Post Facto Law-The Constitution also forbids the federal
government from enacting any "ex post facto law."'34 A noted commentator,
Professor John Norton Pomeroy, defines such laws as
[laws which] declare an act criminal, and provide for its punish-
ment, which, at the time of its commission, was not a crime; or
such as change the punishment of a known crime in any other
manner than by mitigating it, and are to operate upon past as
well as future offenses .... 35
Traditionally, only laws imposing criminal sanctions after the com-
mission of acts which give rise to such sanctions have been characterized
as ex post facto laws. 36 However, at least one federal court has given the
ex post facto law proscription a broader reading so as to encompass civil
legislation which adversely affects individuals. In Hiss v. Hampton,3 7 the
Federal District Court of the District of Columbia invalidated two statutes
authorizing the federal government to deny civil service pensions to former
governmental employees who had falsely testified about national security
matters or who had concealed the fact of their membership in the
Community Party. Both plaintiffs were denied pensions on account of
events occurring before the passage of the statutes. Indeed, the statutes
were enacted in a conscious effort to rescind the pension of one of the
plaintiffs, Alger Hiss, who had been convicted of perjury and was thought
to be a Communist spy.38 The court examined the legislative history of
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
31 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
32 Id. at 619.
33 328 U.S. at 316.
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
35 J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 420 (10th ed. 1888). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 390 (1798);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
36 This restrictive interpretation of ex post facto laws, confining them to criminal
legislation, has been challenged as being contrary to the intent of the framers and
ratifiers of the Federal Constitution. See generally DeWitt, Are Our Legal Tender
Laws Ex Post Facto?, 15 POL. Sci. Q. 96 (1900); McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in
the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 269 (1927).
:37 338 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1972).
38 See generally F. COOK, THE UNFINISHED STORY OF ALGER Hiss (1958).
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the statutes and found them to be "punitive and not regulatory, ' '39 reasoning
that "[rletroactive punishment of former employees for their past misdoings
has no reasonable bearing upon regulation of the conduct of those presently
employed. '40 The court then stated that an ex post facto law need not be
criminal but need only display a punitive intent.
In light of Hiss, congressional legislation terminating or reducing the
retirement benefits of a former President for prior misconduct would
constitute an invalid ex post facto law; it could not be excused on the basis
that it regulated the behavior of Presidents of the United States. However,
such legislation would escape the prohibition again'st ex post facto laws if
the means chosen by Congress to terminate or reduce the benefits had
some rational nexus to the congressional objective of regulating the conduct
of former Presidents. Thus, the Supreme Court, in DeVeau v. Braisted,41
rejected an ex post facto challenge to a New York statute disqualifying
felons from holding office in any waterfront labor organization. The plural-
ity opinion in DeVeau declared that the statute was not a proscribed ex
post facto law, since the "restriction of the individual [came] about as a
relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as the proper
qualifications for a profession. ' 42 Thus, if it could be shown that Congress'
termination or reduction of pension benefits sought to regulate the current
behavior of former Presidents, Hiss could be distinguished on the basis that
the behavior of former Presidents during retirement must be regulated be-
cause of the President's prominent and powerful position in our constitu-
tional system and the example former Presidents must set for the people of
this nation.
3. Substantive Due Process-Under the fifth amendment, the federal
government is prohibited from depriving any individual of his "life,"
"liberty," or "property" without "due process of law." Thus, legislation
terminating or reducing a former President's retirement benefits might
deprive the former President of his "substantive" 43 due process rights de-
pending upon the nature of the interest terminated or reduced. The interest
39 338 F. Supp. at 1148.
40 Id.
41 363 U.S. 144 (1960).4 2 Id. at 160.
43 The distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" due process has been
defined as follows:
Taken literally, the term due process relates to the mode of proceeding
that must be pursued by governmental agencies. Due process of law,
in this sense, denotes proper procedure, and it was the meaning pri-
marily intended by the men who drafted the Bill of Rights.
From the beginning, however, a broader conception has been urged.
Under it, the Due Process Clause imposes requirements of substance as
well as procedure. ...
... Substantive due process has been erected by the Supreme Court
as the essential bulwark against arbitrary government action. Arbitrary
action in the due process sense, means action that is willful and un-
reasonable-depending on the will alone and not done according to
reason or judgment.
B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165 (1972).
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of a former President in the continued receipt of his entire pension might
be characterized alternatively as (a) a preferred "personal privacy" interest,
(b) a "vested" property or contractual right, (c) an interest in having his
eligibility for the pension determined in an individual hearing, or (d) an
unpreferred "economic" interest. The characterization of this interest for
the purposes of substantive due process analysis will determine the level
of judicial scrutiny applicable to the contemplated congressional legislation.
(a) Preferred "Personal Privacy" Interest-If the interest of the former
President in the continued receipt of his full retirement benefits were
deemed a "preferred" constitutional interest, i.e., a fundamental right or
liberty, a strict standard of due process would apply to protect his interest
against which only a "compelling state interest" could justify the termina-
tion or reduction of his retirement benefits.44 One source of such a
preferred interest is a zone of personal privacy.45 Nevertheless, a funda-
mental right to receive Presidential retirement benefits would probably not
be recognized; recent Supreme Court decisions have recognized only those
interests which intimately relate to an individual's life style as fundamental
4 4 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See also Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). Although Roe applied
the "compelling interest" test to state legislation under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the same test is applicable under the fifth amendment.
Compare Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) with Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915) where the Court invalidated federal and state attempts to outlaw
"yellow dog" labor contracts on the grounds of substantive due process under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Assuming arguendo that such a fundamental right were recognized and Presiden-
tial pensions were scrutinized under the strict due process standard, legislation af-
fecting a former President's retirement benefits could be upheld only if a "compell-
ing state interest" outweighed the former President's right to such benefits. If a
President resigned after committing a serious impeachable offense but before being
impeached, legislation terminating or reducing his pension would satisfy the "com-
pelling state interest" test if the federal government could show a compelling in-
terest in regulating the conduct of future Presidents in office by deterring them from
committing impeachable offenses or in regulating the conduct of former Presidents
once they have left office. A "compelling state interest" was found in Roe to the
extent that the state protected health, medical standards and prenatal life by reg-
ulating abortions during the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. 410 U.S.
at 162-65.
In order to pass strict due process scrutiny, legislation must be narrowly drawn to
further only the legitimate state interests at stake. 410 U.S. at 155. For example,
Congress could not restrict a former President's first amendment activities, such as
speechmaking and writing, in addition to terminating or reducing his or her retire-
ment benefits. To illustrate this "overbreadth" aspect of due process analysis, the
Court, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), invalidated a federal
provision denying passports to Communist Party members because it "too broadly and
indiscriminately restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges the liberty guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment." 378 U.S. at 505.
45 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152. The Court there states that
[tihe Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a
line of decisions, however . . . the Court has recognized that a right
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of pri-
vacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court
or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that
right in the First Amendment . . . in the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments . . . in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights . . . in the Ninth
FALL 1975]
Journal of Law Reform
rights entitled to stringent due process protection. Thus, in Roe v. Wade,46
the Court recognized that a pregnant woman has a fundamental right to
have an abortion; in Griswold v. Connecticut47 the Court declared that
married couples have a fundamental right to use contraceptives. Legis-
lation terminating or reducing a former President's retirement benefits
would not affect delicate and intimate aspects of a former President's life
style of the nature involved in Roe and Griswold and would not, therefore,
be scrutinized under the strict due process standard applied where a funda-
mental interest is at issue.
(b) Vested Property Rights and Entitlements-Prior to 1960 the Su-
preme Court distinguished between vested property or contractual rights and
gratuities. 48 Gratuities were defined as pensions, compensation allowances,
and privileges which, because they were conferred by Congress at its dis-
cretion, were subject to revision or withdrawal by Congress without regard
to due process considerations. 49 The mere fixing of a pension or compensa-
tion allowance is insufficient to create a vested right in an employee to
receive the benefits. 50 In Pennie v. Reis,51 the Court held that until a pen-
sion or retirement payment is due, the employee's right thereto is "a mere
expectancy, created by the law and liable to be revoked or destroyed by
the same authority. 52
Vested property or contractual rights, which the Court held could be
modified only in compliance with the fifth amendme'nt due process pro-
visions,53 arose when the party claiming the benefits of the rights had acted
to his or her detriment 54 or when the benefits were actually paid by the
government making the original gratuitous promise enforceable. 55 In John-
son v. United States,50 the court found the pension of a retired federal judge
vested since the judge's retirement was induced by the pension benefits.
The court stated:
[The judge] has a right to demand it not as a pension or a
gratuity, but as the consideration offered to induce him to give up
his right to hold office as long as lives. 57
Amendment . . . or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . These decisions make it
clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" ... are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy.
46410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934).
49 Id. at 577.
50 Id.
51 132 U.S. 464 (1889).
52 Id. at 471.
53 See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579. The Court also indicated that
the fifth amendment's command that private property not be taken by the federal
government without making just compensation to the owner operates to protect
a vested property or contractual right. Id. at 579.
54 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 208, 210 (Ct. CI. 1948).
5 5 See Rafferty v. United States, 210 F.2d 934, 936 (3d Cir. 1954); Nordstrom v.
United States, 342 F.2d 55, 60 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
56 79 F. Supp. 208 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
571d. at 210.
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Although the judge's act in Johnson was deemed sufficient consideration to
vest his rights to the pension, the fact that a person was induced, at least
in part, to perform a certain job in reliance upon pension benefits was
never deemed sufficient to give rise to the vesting of those benefits.58
The Former Presidents Act, by granting benefits to a President who
resigns before the impeachment process is consummated, induces Presi-
dents facing imminent impeachment and conviction to resign and thereby
to save the nation from the agony of a quasi-criminal trial of its Chief
Executive. 59 Therefore, a former President whose resignation was induced
by the promise of a pension could claim a vested right to that pension, and
any legislation terminating the pension would come under due process
scrutiny.60
Since 1960, however, the Court has apparently rejected this distinction
between vested rights and gratuities for purposes of substantive due process
analysis61 and has given all property interests fifth amendment protection.r 2
Property interests, or "entitlements," 63 are examined under the "minimal
scrutiny" test of equal protection analysis. Thus, regarding federal legisla-
tion interfering with individual property interests in noncontractual govern-
mental benefits,
the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only
if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly
lacking in rational justification.64
The Former Presidents Act is analyzed under the minimal scrutiny
standard of equal protection in part II B 4 below.
(c) Interest in an Individualized Determination-Legislation provid-
ing for the termination or reduction of Presidential retirement benefits upon
the occurrence of certain conditions would interfere with a former Presi-
dent's interest in having an individualized determination of his eligibility
for these benefits and could thereby trigger the "irrebuttable presumption"
doctrine of substantive due process. This doctrine was summarized in
Vlandis v. Kline,65 where the Supreme Court invalidated certain Connecti-
cut procedures for determining resident and nonresident tuition rates and
stated that
it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual
the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable
presumption of nonresidence when that presumption is not
necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has
58 See, e.g., Stouper v. Jones, 284 F.2d 240, 242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
59 See note 175 and accompanying text infra.
60 See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
61 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960).
62 Id. at 611. See also United States v. Macioci, 345 F. Supp. 325, 327-28 (D.R.I.
1972).
63 The "entitlement" concept as it relates to property interests protected by the
due process clauses of both the fifth and fourteenth amendments is derived from
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
64 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
65 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determi-
nation. 60
For example, if legislation terminating the retirement benefits of former
Presidents who were found guilty of a felony as defined by federal law were
enacted, a former President who had been convicted of a felony could
claim that, notwithstanding his felony conviction, he remains within the
class of former Presidents Congress intended to reward by passing the
Former Presidents Act; due process requires that he be entitled to an indi-
vidualized determination as to his right to receive these benefits. 6 Such
legislation would create an irrebuttable presumption that all former Presi-
dents found guilty of a felony under federal law are undeserving of these
benefits. This presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact
since a former President could live an exemplary life yet technically be a
felon. 68 The federal government could provide reasonable alternative means
for determining whether or not a former President is worthy of retirement
benefits; for example, a special administrative tribunal could be created to
review all cases.
Even though the irrebuttable presumption doctrine might analytically
apply to this situation, the substantive due process claim to an individual
determination is probably untenable here. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 69 the
Court refused to apply the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and upheld
Social Security Act provisions prohibiting a wage earner's spouse from
receiving insurance benefits unless the spouse's relationship to the wage
earner had existed for at least nine months prior to the wage earner's death.
The district court in Salfi applied the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and
invalidated the legislation; it found that the Social Security Act provisions
employed an irrebuttable presumption that marriages which did not pre-
cede a wage earner's death by at least nine months were entered into for
the fraudulent purpose of securing social security benefits. 70 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine of sub-
stantive due process is inapplicable to this "noncontractual claim to receive
funds from the public treasury." 7' The Court added that the district court's
66 Id. at 452.
67 Nevertheless, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine would not apply to legisla-
tion passed with respect to a specific former President, since in that situation Con-
gress would have individually determined his claim to these Presidential retirement
benefits. However, such legislation would be invalid either as a bill of attainder or
ex post facto law. See parts II B I and 2 supra.
68 For example, a former President could be a felon if he were an outside director
of a corporation which violated the antitrust prohibitions of the Sherman Act. Since
his crime could conceivably involve no "moral turpitude," the presumption that he
would be unworthy of these retirement benefits would not be neces3arily or uni-
versally true. See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. 1975).
69 95 S. Ct. 2457 (1975).
70 Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 2457
(1975).
71 95 S. Ct. at 2470. Although the language the Court uses here might recall the
old distinction between "vested rights" and "gratuities," it should be noted that the
Supreme Court has apparently abandoned this substantive due process test and af-
forded constitutional protection to all property interests. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960) and part II B 3(b) supra.
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application of this doctrine to the eligibility requirement in issue
would turn the doctrine of [Vlandis v. Kline] into a virtual engine
of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have
heretofore been thought consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution '7 2
and that the proper standard of review of social security legislation is the
minimal scrutiny equal protection test,73 discussed below in part II B 4.
Thus, on the basis of Salfi, the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine
would not be applied to legislation terminating or reducing Presidential
retirement benefits upon the occurrence of certain conditions. Since a
former President's interest in his retirement benefits resembles a claim to
social security benefits, his interest can be classified as a "noncontractual
claim to receive funds from the public treasury, '74 to which only the safe-
guard of equal protection applies.75
(d) Unprejerred "Economic" Interest-Legislation terminating or re-
ducing Presidential retirement benefits would interfere with a former
President's receipt of his entire pension, thereby triggering the "rational
relationship" test of substantive due process. This test was articulated by
the Court in dicta in Nebbia v. New York,7 6 where a state milk price con-
trol scheme was upheld against a substantive due process challenge under
the fourteenth amendment:
The Fifth amendment, in the field of federal activity . . . [does]
not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. [It]
merely condition[s] thz exertion of the admitted power, by secur-
ing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with
due process. And the guaranty of due process . . . demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial re-
lation to the object sought to be attained. 77
This standard of review under the fifth amendment's due process clause
is extremely lax, granting Congress extensive freedom to legislate in the
economic arena so long as such legislation does not infringe any funda-
mental rights or liberties.78 Indeed, the rational relationship test presumes
72 95 S. Ct. at 2470. This comment reflects criticism of the "irrebuttable presump-
tion" doctrine that there is no principled basis upon which to limit its application.
See, e.g., Comment, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal
Process or Due Protection, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 800 (1974). For a recent defense of
the doctrine see Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Struc-
tures: Learning from Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975).
73 95 S. Ct. at 2470.
74 Id.
75 But see United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), where
the Court relied upon the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to invalidate federal
legislation restricting food stamp allocations to individuals not classified as "de-
pendent children" for federal income tax purposes. The Salfi Court incorrectly cites
this decision as an equal protection case. 95 S. Ct. at 2470.
76 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
77 Id. at 525.
78 As early as 1938 the Supreme Court recognized that federal and state legislation
infringing on fundamental rights and liberties would be subject to stricter judicial
scrutiny. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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that the legislation is consonant with the demands of the due process clause:
Even in the absence of [legislative histories] the existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regu-
latory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is
not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character
as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.7 9
Whether federal interference with a former President's economic interest
in the continued receipt of his pension would violate his substantive due
process rights depends on whether the legislation depriving the former
President of the benefits bears a rational relation to the objective sought to
be achieved. If the objective of the legislation was the regulation of the
behavior of Presidents and former Presidents, the fact that most people's
behavior is affected by the prospect of a monetary award shows a rational
relation of the legislation to the objective of the legislature. Also, no
Supreme Court case since 193680 has invalidated federal or state economic
regulations under the rational relationship test; even the most specious
means have been found to possess a "real and substantial relation" to the
desired objective.8 ' For example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,8 2 the
Court sustained an Oklahoma statute which prohibited anyone except
a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist from fitting lenses. The Court
reasoned that the legislation was consistent with substantive due process
since a legislature in its discretion might conclude that a professional fitting
is needed with sufficient frequency to warrant such a fitting in every case.
The Court added that the legislation
need not be in every respect consistent with its aims to be con-
stitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure
was a rational way to correct it. s3
Legislation terminating or reducing Presidential retirement benefits ap-
pears to bear sufficient relationship to the congressional purpose to survive
a due process challenge. However, it is unlikely that a pure due process
argument would be advanced. Since 19604 the Supreme Court has also
reviewed challenges to federal "economic" legislation under the "implied"
equal protection clause of the fifth amendment.8 5 This aspect of judicial
79 Id. at 152.
80 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
81 See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34 (1962).
82 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
83 ld. at 487-88.
84 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1960).
85 See generally Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). Although the Constitution contains no equal protection
clause that explicitly applies to the federal government, the Supreme Court applies
equal protection analysis to claims under the fifth amendment's due process clause.
See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
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review under the fifth amendment will be discussed below in part II B 4.
4. Equal Protection-Legislation terminating or reducing Presidential
retirement benefits would be subject to equal protection challenges as being
"underinclusive" or "overinclusive" depending upon the background and
nature of the legislation. 8 For example, if the legislation revoked only a
specific former President's benefits because he had been found guilty of a
felony under federal law, the legislation would be "underinclusive" since
it would not affect other former Presidents found guilty of felonies. On the
other hand, if the legislation revoked these benefits with respect to all
former Presidents found guilty of a felony under federal law, it would be
"overinclusive" since there might be former Presidents who, though tech-
nically felons, actually deserved these benefits8 7 The degree to which such
"malinclusiveness" will be tolerated varies with the level of judicial scrutiny
applied to the legislative classification. Generally, there are three recognized
levels of judicial scrutiny under equal protection analysis, strict, minimal,
and intermediate, each of which will be discussed below.
(a) Strict Scrutiny-Under the two-tier strict and minimal scrutiny
equal protection framework developed by the Warren Court 8 federal
regulations are strictly scrutinized when "fundamental interests," such as
the rights to vote, s9 to procreate,!"' to travel,' and to have access to the
judicial process, 92 are affected and when "suspect classifications," such as
race,93 alienage, 94 and possible illegitimacy95 and gender, 96 are created by
governmental classifications. Under this rigorous standard of review, the
government must demonstrate that the challenged classification is justified
by a "compelling state interest.'"' 7 Nevertheless, the relevant judicial
precedents in this area indicate that legislation terminating or reducing
Presidential retirement benefits would never trigger strict scrutiny, such
legislation would not directly infringe on a "fundamental interest" of a
former President nor would it create a "suspect classification" as those
concepts have been defined.9 8
86 See note 85 supra.
87 For an example of a situation in which a former President committed a felony
but would still deserve the Presidential retirement benefits, see note 68 supra.
88 For discussion of the two-tier equal protection analysis, see Developments ill the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
" See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
90 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
91 See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
92 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).
93 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
94 See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973).
9 See, e.g., Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
96 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
97 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
98 See notes 88-96 and accompanying text supra.
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(b) Minimal Scrutiny-Legislation terminating or reducing Presiden-
tial retirement benefits upon the occurrence of certain conditions but
with reference to a specific former President would satisfy the "minimal
scrutiny" standard of equal protection if such legislation were rationally
related to a legitimate governmental goal. However, if legislation were
enacted to terminate or reduce the pension of a specific former President,
such legislation would be invalid under the "closed class" doctrine of equal
protection analysis. The Supreme Court has traditionally applied an
extremely deferential standard of review, otherwise known as "minimal
scrutiny," to equal protection challenges to federal regulations governing
disbursements of governmental benefits.99 This standard was summarized
in Richardson v. Belcher,100 in which the Court upheld federal social
security legislation reducing insurance benefits to reflect state worker's
compensation payments against an equal protection challenge and stated:
A statutory classification in the area of social welfare is consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
if it is "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination."
..... While the present case, involving as it does a federal statute,
does not directly implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, a classification that meets the test articulated
[above] is perforce consistent with the due process requirement
of the Fifth Amendment....
If the goals sought are legitimate, and the classification
adopted is rationally related to the achievement of those goals,
then the action of Congress is not so arbitrary as to violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 10 1
In Flemming v. Nestor,10 2 the Court applied the "minimal scrutiny" test
of equal protection to federal legislation terminating old-age social security
benefits payable to aliens deported for certain specified reasons. The Court
found that the legislation was not a "patently arbitrary classification, utterly
lacking in rational justification"1 03 since the economic benefits of the social
security system, the increased overall national purchasing power resulting
from monetary allotments to senior citizens, would not result in cases
where payments were made to persons permanently residing abroad be-
cause of deportation.1 0 4 The Court added that
[n]or, apart from this, can it be deemed irrational for Congress to
have concluded that the public purse should not be utilized to
contribute to the support of those deported on the grounds speci-
fied in the statute.101
99 See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1078
(1969). See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 95 S. Ct. 2457 (1975), in which the Court ap-
plied the "minimal scrutiny" test, upholding federal social security legislation which
denied benefits to a wage earner's widow and stepchild if their relationship to the
wage earner did not exist at least nine months prior to his death. See notes 69-71 and
accompanying text supra.
100 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
101 Id. at 81, 84.
102 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
103 Id at 611.
104 Id. at 612.
105 Id.
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In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,"", however, the
Supreme Court, employing the minimal scrutiny test, invalidated certain
amendments to the federal Food Stamp Act of 1964 which were intended
to deprive "hippies" and members of "hippie communes" of the continued
receipt of federal food stamps. The amendments excluded from participa-
tion in the food stamp program any household containing an individual
who was unrelated to any other household member. After reviewing the
legislative record in which the purpose of the classification was clearly
articulated, the Court declared that the
challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference
to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception
of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest. As a result, "[a] purpose to discriminate against
hippies cannot in and of itself, and without reference to [some
independent] considerations in the public interest, justify the
1971 amendment.' 10 7
The Court also held that the challenged classification could not be upheld
as rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in minimizing
fraud in the administration of the food stamp program since "the chal-
lenged classification simply does not operate so as rationally to further
the prevention of fraud;" 10 8 because of defects in the drafting of the law,
two unrelated individuals living together could legally avoid the "unrelated
person" exclusion by simply altering their living conditions so as not to
constitute an ineligible "household." Thus, the Court concluded that
in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from par-
ticipation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are
"likely to abuse the program" but, rather, only those persons who
are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to
alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.
Traditional equal protection analysis does not require that every
classification be drawn with precise " 'mathematical nicety.' "...
But the classification here in issue is not only "imprecise," it is
wholly without any rational basis [and therefore] invalid under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment .... I.l
In light of Flemming and Moreno, legislation terminating or reducing
Presidential retirement benefits upon the occurrence of certain conditions
but without reference to a specific former President would satisfy the
"minimal scrutiny" test of equal protection if such legislation bore a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate governmental goal. For example,
legislation which terminated the pension of any former President convicted
of a felony as defined by federal law would have the same effect that the
legislation in Flemming and Moreno had: denial of certain governmental
100413 U.S. 528 (1973).
107 Id. at 534-35.
108 1d. at 537.
109 Id. at 538.
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benefits to a class of individuals deemed unworthy to receive them. Such
legislation would be rationally related to the legitimate governmental goal
of deterring Presidents and former Presidents from enaging in criminal
conduct during their tenure in office and during retirement, in order to
maintain the dignity of the Presidency. Such legislation can be distinguished
from that involved in Moreno since it constitutes more than a "bare con-
gressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group"110 and refers to
the independent public interest in upholding the dignity of the office of the
Presidency by deterring criminal acts by occupants and former occupants
of that office. However, if the legislation terminated the retirement benefits
of any former President who is or has been a member of the Ku Klux Klan
or the Rainbow Peoples Party, for example, such legislation would be
invalid under Moreno since Congress would be motivated by a desire to
punish a politically unpopular group and no countervailing public consider-
ations would justify the legislation. 1 '
Conversely, legislation terminating or reducing retirement benefits allo-
cated to a specific former President, for example, a congressional act
declaring that "former President X" will no longer receive Presidential
retirement benefits, would be constitutionally prohibited by the "closed
class" doctrine of equal protection. 112 This doctrine, developed by the
Supreme Court in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. and the State of
Kansas'13 and Morey v. Doud,114 applies whenever legislation grants or
denies certain benefits to members of a specific group to the exclusion of
all others. If the statutory classification bears no more than a remote rela-
tionship to the legislative purpose, such legislation violates the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection. In Cotting, the Court invalidated a
Kansas statute regulating certain aspects of "public stock yards."" 5 The
statute had the practical effect of regulating only one stockyard, 116 although
the regulated class of "public stock yards" remained theoretically "open"
- any stockyard which met the statutory definition of a public stockyard
would be subject to the regulations. 117 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
found the statute
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
"Old. at 534.
111 Not only would this legislation violate the equal protection guarantee of the
fifth amendment, it would also be an unconstitutional bill of attainder. See part II B 1
supra. In addition, the legislation might violate the former President's first amend-
ment right of association. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), in which
the Court invalidated, on first amendment grounds, federal legislation making it a
crime for any member of a Communist-action organization to be employed in any
defense facility with knowledge or notice that there was in effect a final order from
the federal government requiring the organization to register under the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950.
112 Such legislation would also be a constitutionally prohibited bill of attainder. See
part II B I supra.
113 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
114 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
115 183 U.S. at 81-82.
116I d. at 114-15.
117 354 U.S. at 467.
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United States, in that it applies only to the Kansas City Stock
Yards Company and not to other companies or corporations
engaged in like business in Kansas, and thereby denies to that
company the equal protection of the laws. 118
In Morey, the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute excepting
money orders issued by the American Express Company from the require-
ment that any firm selling or issuing money orders in the state must secure a
license and submit to state regulation. The Court's decision that the statutory
classification was invalid under the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause was influenced by three factors: (1) the statutory classification bore
only a remote relationship to the legislative purpose; 119 (2) the creation of
a "closed class;' 120 and (3) the grant of economic advantages to the closed
class. 1 2 1 The Court noted that the intention of the legislature was to afford
the public protection against the financial collapse of the drawers of money
orders. 122 The Court reasoned that the statutory classification bore only
a remote relationship to this legislative purpose since it was based on the
erroneous assumption that the financial condition of the American Express
Company would remain stable and that competing sellers of money orders
would not secure a comparable status. 2 3 The Court also noted that the
classification did not consider the peculiar characteristics of the local outlets
selling American Express money orders, since there was a "distinct possi-
bility that they ... may afford less protection to the public than ... retail
establishments that sell competing money orders."'1 24 The Court found that
by limiting the exception to American Express the legislature created a
"closed class.' 125 Other drawers of money orders could not ascribe to this
class by showing financial stability; they were excluded from the relief from
licensing granted to American Express under the law.12 6 Moreover, the
exemption from licensing bestowed upon American Express substantial
economic benefits. For example, American Express, unlike similarly situ-
ated companies regulated by the legislation, could sell its money orders
in retail establishments, was not required to furnish a surety bond and
insurance policy, did not have to pay annual license and investigation fees,
and did not have to submit annual financial reports to the state auditor. 127
The Supreme Court concluded that, "[taking all of these factors in
118 183 U.S. at 114-15 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court's opinion invalidated the
legislation on equal protection and substantive due process grounds. Id. at 112.
119 354 U.S. at 467-68.
120 Id. at 467.
121 Id. at 468-69.
12 2 Id. at 460.
123 Id. at 466-67.
124 Id. at 467.
125 The Illinois statute also exempted money orders of the United States Post Of-
fice, the Postal Telegraph Company and the Western Union Telegraph Company.
Nevertheless, the appellees did not challenge these exceptions. The Court noted, 354
U.S. at 462 n.5, that a prior lower court decision, Currency Services, Inc. v.
Matthews, 90 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Wis. 1950), had validated similar exceptions in a
similar Wisconsin statute.
126 354 U.S. at 458-59.
127 354 U.S. at 460-61.
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conjunction . . . we hold that the application of the Act to appellees
deprives them of the equal protection of the laws.' 2 8
Legislation terminating or reducing a particular former President's re-
tirement benefits would involve each of the three factors of the closed class
doctrine and would, therefore, violate the equal protection guarantee of
the fifth amendment's due process clause. If the legislation terminated
"former President X's" retirement benefits because he had been found
guilty of a felony as defined by federal law, this statutory classification
would bear no more than a remote relationship to the legislative purpose of
upholding the dignity of the Presidency and insulating the political process
from criminal abuses, since the statute would not withhold retirement
benefits from other former Presidents found guilty of federal felonies. By
terminating or reducing his retirement benefits, the legislation would be
exclusively penalizing one former President, just as the legislation in
Cotting penalized only the one Kansas stockyard. 129
(c) Intermediate Scrutiny-The Supreme Court has recently departed
from a strict two-tier equal protection analysis by developing an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny between "strict" and "minimal." 130 An authorita-
tive standard for this level of judicial scrutiny has yet to be announced by
the Court itself, but Professor Gerald Gunther has described this developing
means-oriented level of equal protection analysis as follows:
The model suggested by the recent developments would view
equal protection as a means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred
ground of decision in a broad range of cases. Stated most simply,
it would have the Court take seriously a constitutional require-
ment that has never been formally abandoned; that legislative
means must substantially further legislative ends .... Putting con-
sistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the
Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by
exercising its imagination. It would have the Court assess the
means in terms of legislative purposes that have a substantial
basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would
have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means
on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than
resorting to rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial
hypothesizing. 13 1
It is unlikely that intermediate scrutiny would be triggered by an equal
protection challenge to legislation terminating or reducing Presidential
retirement benefits. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically iden-
tified the types of legislative classifications which will demand the application
128 Id. at 469.
1'9 Recent applications of the "closed class" standard have been rare. See, e.g.,
Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1974) (invalidating city
ordinance regulating food licenses via a grandfather clause).
130 For an extensive discussion of this new "intermediate" scrutiny, see Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
131 Id. at 20-21.
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of intermediate scrutiny, the Court has generally restricted its application
to cases involving sex discrimination 132 and individual privacy interests. 133
Since neither of those two factors would be involved in legislation affecting
Presidential retirement benefits, 3 4 intermediate scrutiny would not be
triggered by such legislation.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM
Three alternatives to the present system of allocating retirement benefits
to former Presidents are possible. Congress could repeal the Act altogether,
depriving all Presidents of benefits upon leaving office. Alternatively,
Congress could amend the Act, conditioning the grant of pension benefits on
a former President's good conduct in office or retirement. Finally, Congress
could amend the Act to require the termination of a former President's
benefits if he is impeached and convicted at any point during his lifetime.
A. Repeal
Repeal of all current statutes granting retirement benefits 135 would enable
Congress to consider former Presidents' petitions for such benefits on an ad
hoc basis and provide special relief as needed. The costs of such a scheme
would probably outweigh the benefits inherent in allocating money on the
basis of need and worthiness. The scheme could personally embarrass many
former Presidents who would, in effect, be required to petition Congress
for relief. More importantly, this scheme could generate political abuse:
Congress might withhold benefits from a needy former President on
partisan grounds. Also, this scheme is inconsistent with other federal pen-
sion systems for members of the legislative and judicial branches of
government; former Vice-Presidents, 136 Senators, 137 Congressmen 38 and
retired federal judges 139 receive regular retirement benefits pursuant to
132See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (federal social se-
curity provisions discriminating between widows and widowers of deceased wage
earners regarding survivors' benefits violate the equal protection guarantee of the
fifth amendment) and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Idaho probate statute giving
preference to males over females in the assignment of executors of decedents' estates
held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
133 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts statute pro-
hibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals held to violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
134 See part 1I B 3(a) supra. See also Comment, "Newer" Equal Protection: The
hnpact of the Means-Focused Model, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 665 (1974), for a review
of lower court decisions applying this standard.
135 3 U.S.C. § 102 note (1970); 39 U.S.C. § 3214 (Supp. 1973); 39 U.S.C. § 3216(b)
(Supp. 1973).
1365 U.S.C. §§ 2106, 8331-8348 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 28 U.S.C. §§ 371-376 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
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federal statutes. 140 In addition, blanket repeal might be attacked as a bill
of attainder or ex post facto law.'41
B. Proscription of Certain Conduct
Another alternative to the present system of allocating Presidential
retirement benefits is to amend the Former Presidents Act to withhold
benefits in the event a former President engages in certain conduct. The
optimal provision, in light of the policy objectives of the Former Presi-
dents Act, 142 would be to withhold these benefits when a former President
commits an "impeachable offense" during his official tenure and afterward.
Nonetheless, this provision raises two problems. First, Congress may not
have the constitutional power to define the category of impeachable
offenses outside a particular impeachment situation. Many commentators
assume that Congress does possess such power, but the design of the
Constitution seems to leave the definition of impeachable offenses to be
determined case by case. 14 3 Second, assuming that Congress has the con-
stitutional power to enumerate prospective impeachable offenses, it is not
clear that Congress would be wise in making this enumeration or that it
would be possible for it to do so. In addition to treason and bribery, a
President may be impeached for committing "other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.' 1 44 Although the meaning of this phrase has been exten-
sively discussed, scholars have yet to agree on its specific content.145 This
inability of scholars to agree on an appropriate meaning of "other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors," coupled with the necessary function of
impeachment as a "constitutional safety valve [which] must be flexible
enough to cope with exigencies not now foreseeable,' 146 makes it imprac-
140 When the Former Presidents Act was introduced in Congress in 1957, pro-
ponents of the measure emphasized that inactive five-star generals and admirals re-
ceived full salaries during their lifetimes as "elder military statesmen" while former
Presidents, as elder political statesmen, received no retirement benefits whatsoever.
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4401 and S. 607 Before the House Comm. on the Post
Office and Civil Service, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1957). Great Britain, Canada and
Ireland have statutory pension plans for their retired heads-of-state which resemble
the present American System. See Ministerial Salaries Consolidation Act 1965, c. 58,
§ 3; Ministerial Salaries and Members' Pension Act 1965, c. 11, § 17; Parliamentary
and Other Pensions Act 1972, c. 48, §§ 26-31 (Great Britain); CAN. REV. STAT. C.
M-10, § 16 (1970), as amended, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 25 (Ist Supp. 1970), CAN. REV.
STAT. c. 18 (2d Supp. 1970), CAN. REV. STAT. C. 14 (2d Supp. 1972); 2 CAN. STAT.
CITATOR c. 36, § 12 (1973) (Canada); Presidential Establishment Act 1938, No. 24,
§§ 3-5, as amended, Pensions (Abatement) Act 1965, No. 13, § 3 (Ireland).
141 See parts II B 1 and 2 supra.
142 See part I supra.
143 See, e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 77-78
(1973); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 796-97 (4th ed. 1873).
144 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
145 See, e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 53-102
(1973); C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 25-52 (1974).
146 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 25 (Comm. Print 1974).
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tical and unwise for Congress to specifically define the category of
impeachable offenses.1 47
Alternatively, Congress could amend the Former Presidents Act to
withhold retirement benefits in the event a former President commits
certain specified crimes during his tenure in office and afterward. Under
the federal civil service retirement system, the pension benefits of
former Vice-Presidents, Senators and Congressmen are terminated if they
are convicted of certain crimes which pertain to national security.' 48 The
payment of veterans benefits is conditioned on similar forfeiture pro-
visions.' 49 Nevertheless, the wisdom of such an approach is questionable
since, in terms of the overall policy objectives of the Former Presidents
Act, 150 it would be difficult to define which acts would justfy the termina-
tion of these retirement benefits in every case. 151
C. Termination Pursuant to Impeachment:
A Proposal for Reform
The most promising alternative to the present pension system is to
amend the Former Presidents Act to deny any President retirement benefits
upon his or her impeachment and conviction by Congress, even when he
or she leaves office before conviction. To implement this proposal, section
(f) of the Former Presidents Act should be amended as follows:
As used in this section, the term "former President" means a
person-
(1) who shall have held the office of President of the United
States of America;
(2) who shall not have been impeached and convicted by Con-
gress pursuant to the Constitution of the United States of
America either before or after leaving office; and
(3) who does not currently hold such office.
The major problem with this proposal is that it contemplates impeach-
ment and conviction of a President after the expiration of his official
tenure; whether this is constitutionally permissible is unresolved. The
framers of the impeachment provisions never addressed this specific
issue 52 and commentators are divided as to the constitutionality of such
147 Accord, J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 797 (4th ed. 1873).
148 5 U.S.C. §§ 8312-8322 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
149 38 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3504 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1973). These forfeiture
provisions were upheld in Thompson v. Whittier, 185 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1960),
appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 465 (1961).
150 See part I supra.
151 Indeed, such a statutory amendment may violate a former President's equal
protection rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment's due process clause. See part
II B 4 supra.
152 See generally 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, 64-69, 550-52 (1st ed. 1911); 4 J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 32-37, 43-50, 281
(2d ed. 1881).
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action.1 53 Nevertheless, the historical background of impeachment and the
desirability of such a process support the position that a President may be
impeached and convicted by Congress after leaving office.'5 4
The history of impeachment in England and America indicates that a
President may be impeached after leaving office. Under the English practice
prior to the American Revolution and for some time thereafter, private
citizens were subject to the impeachment power of Parliament. 15 5 During
the period in which the American Constitution was formulated and ratified,
the former governor-general of India, Warren Hastings, was impeached
by Parliament more than two years after resigning his office. 156 During this
same period the state constitutions of Virginia and Delaware contained
provisions subjecting their governors to impeachment only after their
official tenure had expired. 157 In The Federalist, James Madison compared
these state impeachment provisions with those in the Federal Constitution,
emphasizing the latter extended the liability of the President by denying
him immunity "during his continuance in office."1 58 In 1876, President
Grant's Secretary of War, William W. Belknap, resigned from office hours
before the House of Representatives voted articles of impeachment against
him.159 At trial, the Senate rejected Belknap's defense that the Senate
lacked the constitutional power to conduct the trial because he was no
longer in office. 160 Nevertheless, this precedent is weakened by the subse-
quent acquittal of Belknap on all charges, with twenty-two Senators voting
153 Examples of commentators asserting that a person who has resigned from
office prior to Congressional action may not be impeached or convicted by the Sen-
ate include T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 204-05 (4th ed. 1931); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 586-87 (5th ed. 1905).
Those who maintain the opposite position include 1 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 113
(1963); 3 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1448-49 (2d ed. 1929); Potts, Inpeachment as a Remedy, 12 ST. Louis L. REV.
15 (1927).
154 See generally Potts, supra note 153.
155 See, e.g., Bestor, Book Review, 49 WASH. L. REV. 255, 277 (1973).
156 See generally P. MARSHALL, THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS (1965).
157 The Virginia constitutional provision provided that
[t]he Governor, when he is out of office, and others, offending against
the state, either by mal-administration, corruption, or other means,
by which the safety of the State may be endangered, shall be impeach-
able by the House of Delegates.
VA. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 7 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
3812, 3818 (1909).
The Delaware constitution imposed a time limit on the impeachment process:
The President when he is out of office and within eighteen months after,
and all others, offending against the state either by mal-administration,
corruption or other means ... shall be impeachable by the House of
Assembly before the Legislative Council.
DEL. CONST. art. 23 (1776).
158 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 252-53 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
159 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM W. BELKNAP,
LATE SECRETARY OF WAR, ON THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITED BY THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 760-61 (1876).
160 Id. at 239-41.
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to acquit on the ground that Congress lacked power to impeach and
convict an official who resigned."" Congress addressed this issue on two
other occasions without ever resolving the problem; 1 2 the federal courts
have never been confronted with the issue. 16 3
Although these historical precedents do not conclusively prove the
existence of congressional power to impeach and convict a President after
he leaves office, there are cogent policy reasons for interpreting the Con-
stitution to allow impeachment of officials who have left office. Article I,
section 3 of the Constitution subjects an impeached and convicted official
to the penalties of removal from office and disqualification from holding
any other federal office. Thus, in order to protect the political system from
future abuses, it is desirable to impeach and convict an official who has
previously left office to disqualify him from holding any future federal
position.14 If Congress attempted to disqualify such an official other than
pursuant to the impeachment power, the necessary legislation would con-
stitute a bill of attainder. 16 5
IV. CONCLUSION
By providing former Presidents with monetary and clerical allowances,
free office space, and free mailing privileges, Congress seeks to achieve
161 Id. at 1165-66. For the statements of individual Senators explaining their votes,
see id. at 1049-1122.
162 In the first impeachment proceeding in American history, that of William
Blount in 1797, Congress was confronted with the question whether it possessed
the constitutional power to impeach and convict a United States Senator after he had
left office. The Senate dismissed the charges brought by the House against Blount on
the ground that a Senator was not a civil officer of the United States and therefore
not subject to impeachment under article II, section 4 of the Constitution. The Sen-
ate discussed, but did not resolve, the issue of whether Congress may impeach and
convict an individual after leaving office. See generally F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS
OF THE UNITED STATES 200-321 (1849).
In 1926 George W. English, a federal district court judge, was impeached by the
House of Representatives on charges of financial corruption. Before the Senate-trial
commenced, English resigned from the bench; six days after his resignation the
Senate voted to dismiss the charges against him. At the time the vote to dismiss was
taken, many senators discussed but did not resolve, whether they could have proceeded
with the trial notwithstanding his resignation. See 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 778-86 (1936); 67 CONG. REC. 6735-36 (1926); 68 CONG.
REC. 3-4 (1926).
In addition, a number of judges have avoided imminent impeachment by the House
of Representatives by resigning before action could be taken. The record contains
no discussion of the issue at hand after their departure. See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 981-1034 (1907); J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE
200-04 (1962).
163 Nevertheless, two state courts, construing state constitutional provisions sim-
ilar to the federal impeachment sections, appear to have reached divergent results.
State v. Hill, 37 Neb. 80, 55 N.W. 794 (1893) (former state officers held not
constitutionally subject to impeachment and conviction after their terms of office had
expired); Ferguson v. Maddox, 114 Tex. 85, 263 S.W. 888 (1924) (former governor
declared constitutionally subject to impeachment and conviction after he had re-
signed from office).
164 This argument is elaborated in Potts, Imnpeachinent as a Remedy, 12 ST. Louis
L. REV. 15, 21-23 (1927).
165 See parts II B 1 and 2 supra.
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valuable social and political objectives affecting the office of the Presidency
and its occupants. 166 Nevertheless, there is a flaw in this pension scheme
which could operate to defeat the laudable goals of the Former Presidents
Act.
As previously noted,167 a President who resigns from office to avoid
impeachment is eligible for retirement benefits under the Former Presidents
Act, resulting in many cases in the grant of a pension to a former President
under inappropriate circumstances. 16 8 Any special legislation enacted to
revoke or reduce a former President's retirement benefits could be struck
down as a bill of attainder, 169 as an ex post facto law, 170 or as a deprivation
of due process 171 and equal protection rights. 17 2
The proposed amendment of the Former Presidents Act, on the other
hand, would reduce the possibility of awarding retirement benefits to a
former President who should not receive them. Nevertheless, this amend-
ment would increase the opportunities for political abuses of the impeach-
ment power, such as impeaching an unpopular former President. 173 The
possibility of such abuse is slight, however, because the institutional
restraints on the impeachment power-the heavy economic, social and
political costs an impeachment engenders-would discourage the use of
impeachment as a tool for partisan sanction. 174 The proposed amendment,
therefore, offers a pragmatic and desirable solution to the Presidential
pension problem. 175
-Patrick E. Mears
166 See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
167 See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
168 Id.
169 See part II B 1 supra.
170 See part II B 2 supra.
171 See part II B 3 supra.
172 See part II B 4 supra.
173 An example of such a partisan impeachment was that of President Andrew
Johnson in 1867. See generally M. BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF
ANDREW JOHNSON (1973).
174 These economic, social and political costs generated by the invocation of the
impeachment process have been enumerated as follows: (1) the process demands
heavy financial expenditures, (2) the process forces Congress to neglect other national
concerns, (3) the procedures involved are baroque and inefficient, and (4) the ex-
perience is politically divisive and rends the national political fabric. R. BERGER, IM-
PEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 122-23, 140, 156-57 (1973); Potts,
Inpeachment as a Rezedy, 12 ST. Louis L. REV. 15, 31-37 (1927); Shartel, Federal
Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the
Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870, 870-73 (1930); Stolz, Disciplining Federal
Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 659, 666-67 (1969).
175 It is arguable, however, that the present aspect of the Former Presidents Act
which permits a president to resign under political pressure and thereby to become
eligible for retirement benefits actually produces a desirable result in that the Presi-
dent is given his benefits in exchange for avoiding the expense and turmoil associated
with impeachment. See note 174 and accompanying text supra.
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